SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CREDIT IN A JAVANESE VILLAGE by Aloysius Gunadi Brata
                                                                                                            
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND CREDIT  
IN A JAVANESE VILLAGE  
  
 




University of  Atma Jaya Yogyakarta 
 





The objective of this study is to investigate empirically the 
influence of social capital on the rural credit in the case of a 
Javanese village. Estimation results indicate difference impact of 
social capital on each type of credit. Meeting attendance was 
found positively influence the amount of formal credit. 
Meanwhile, number of memberships negatively affects the 
amount of informal credit. This study also confirms that the 
rural elites have more accessibility to economic opportunities 
such as formal credit than non-elites do.  Therefore, this study 
suggests that the implementation of formal credit program in 
rural areas should consider not only the existing social capital 
but also the elites in the rural society.  This approach perhaps 
bring improvement on the role of formal credit program as an 
anti poverty program in rural areas.   
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INTRODUCTION  
 
Low access to formal credit persists in most developing economies.  
Poor households usually do not have access to guarantee mechanism, such as 
non-real estate-based collateral (van Bastelaer 2000). He argues this situation, 
combined with the overall lack of information about these potential 
borrowers’, creditworthiness, and contributes to a virtual exclusion of this 
group of borrowers from formal credit markets. According to recent 
development of social capital literatures, that exclusion could be eliminated 
by social capital. For examples a study by Grootaert (1999) that address the 
relationship between social capital and welfare in the case of rural areas of 
three provinces  (Jambi, Central Java and East Nusa Tenggara) found social 
capital positively influence access to credit. 
The objective of this research is to investigate the impact of social 
capital on the rural credit in the case of a Javanese village.  Empirically, social 
capital in this study refers to dimensions of local associations. Considering on 
the specific context of study, investigating the impact of social capital on 
credit is not only on the overall credit but also on types of credit, formal and 
informal one. Moreover, this study also analyse the influence of village leader 
factors on the rural credit.   
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORK  
 
Poor households in rural areas do not familiar with formal credit, 
which deliver funds through formal financial institutions, such as commercial 
banks.  Therefore, formal credit institution needs a mediation or substitution. 
Narayan and Prittchet (1997) argue that social capital could to a better flow of 
information between creditors and borrowers and hence less adverse 
selection and moral hazard in the market for credit. The guarantee of groups 
and pressure by social network credit are important techniques to improve 
credit performance (see Rhyne and Otero 1994).  
In the case of Tanzania, Narayan and Prittchett (1997) found that a 
larger fraction of households in villages with higher social capital report 
using credit for agricultural improvements.  In the case of Indonesia, 
Grootaert (1999) concludes that households with higher social capital are 
better able to obtain credit. He found that members of financial associations 
more likely to obtain credit than non-members and the obtained credit 
amounts were much larger. There are one-fifth of all memberships that its 
prime objective is financial. However, he also indicates that other local   2
associations, whose prime objective is not financial, also contribute to access 
to credit.  In other-word, all associations whatever its prime objectives are 
important to increase the access to credit. Van  Bastelaer (2000) also argues 
that the social networks are important elements of most type of formal or 
informal programs that provide credit access to the poor.  
It is interesting to take a further investigation since recent studies do 
not yet analyse the impact of social capital on specific type of credit.  In 
Indonesia, the major reason of households join local associations is to 
improve their access to credit and savings (Grootaert 1999). We have to 
mention that Grootaert found that a large part of local financial associations 
in his study is located in Central Java. However, contrast to East Nusa 
Tenggara, the dummy variable of Central Java is insignificant both in the 
model of access to credit and amount of credit received.  Central Java has a 
tradition of ROSCAs (Gootaert 1999).  Other study found that more than one-
third of rural households in Bantul (a sub-district in Yogyakarta) are 
members of ROSCAs (Brata 1999). 
ROSCA is one of informal financial institutions. Other sources of 
informal credits are local moneylenders, informal pawnshops, and trade 
credit.  Generally, the fund of ROSCA is rather small than other financial 
associations.   ROSCAs is also already popularised as female activities.   The 
problem is the rural society tends to discriminate the females.   In the 
Grootaert’s study, the coefficients of female head of household are 
insignificant.   
Previous studies shows that low access to formal credit persist in 
Indonesia. For example, Van Diermen (1998) found that fewer respondents 
that have tried to access commercial (bank) credit and less that received credit 
although more than one-half of respondents have the bank accounts. In the 
case of small industrialists in Bantul Yogyakarta, Brata (1999) found only less 
than 10 percents of rural small industrialists has access to credit from banking 
institutions although their bank accounts are sufficient for credit rating. 
Therefore, as Bastelaer (2000) have mentioned, the poorest members of 
society often do not access to micro-finance services. Limited access to formal 
credit is an important reason for poor people to borrow from informal 
markets. In this situation, formal financial institution is a complement of 
informal ones (Ghate 1988).  
Recent credit schemes that designed to combat poverty in Indonesia 
also have critical aspects such as in the controlling mechanism and conditions 
to access the credit (Cameron 1999).  Both aspects may lead rent-seeking or 
money politics practices. These issues are critical since communities, groups,   3
or networks that are isolated, parochial, or counterproductive to society’s 
collective interests (see: World Bank 2000). Therefore, social capital does not 
guarantee poor people to access formal credit.   
Tonkiss (2000) warns that the forms of social capital are not simply or 
necessarily conductive to economic development, in two respects. The first 
has to do with inequality, the second with questions of capacity. According to 
Tonkiss, where resources of social capital are unevenly distributed, social 
networks can be a basis for corruption, cronyism, or other forms of rent-
seeking behaviour.  
Therefore, local associations could be the rent-seeker’s vehicles to 
exploit the recent credit schemes.   The association that sponsored by a 
corrupt government is vulnerable to rent-seeking behaviour by its members 
that have a closed link to the government. At the village level, the corrupt 
members of associations probably are the village leaders or the local elites. As 
Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001) have mentioned, the role of specific village 
leader or other influential individual in the internal dynamic of community is 
acknowledged. In this situation, one may expect that social capital does not 
automatically increase the access to economic opportunities and resources 
such as formal credit.  
The second point of Tonkiss’ critic on the effect of social capital is the 
questions of capacity. She suggests that social networks cannot simply create 
physical or financial capital where this does not already exist.  Strong social 
ties become useless under domination of ‘mainstream’ economic and social 
networks. ‘Network poverty’ in this sense refers not to the absence or 
weakness of social network, but to the difficulty of accessing opportunities or 
resources through these networks. Therefore, talk about ‘social capital’, here, 
can become a way of not talking about poverty. Grootaert (1999) also 
indicates these notions. Although he argues that investing in social capital is a 
sensible strategy for poor households in Indonesia, however he also suggests 
that the poor have to work their way into social capital while the rich ‘buy’ 
their way.  
   




Dukuh Senden  in Prambanan, a sub-district in Sleman, Yogyakarta 
Indonesia was the location of field survey. Questioner is partially adopted 
from World Bank (1998) and our previous study (Brata 1999).  Survey was   4
conducted in August 2004. Total respondents in this survey are 70 head of 
households or about 37 percents of total households in Sanden. Social capital 
indicators were inspired by Grootaert’s work that analyses dimensions of 
local association (Grootaert 1999). The dimensions of local associations that 
applied in this research are the number of membership, meeting attendance, 
and participation in decision-making. In order to capture the “benefit” of 
local elites status, survey also collect the information do the respondent is a 
village official or village informal leader.  Note that these indicators indicate 
social capital of head of households due to the role of head of households in 
their household.  
 The number of memberships is the number of memberships of head of 
household in local associations. Field survey found that more than 80 
percents of head of households are member of local financial associations and 
pengajian (Moslem praying group).  On average, each head of household join 
in five associations. TABLE 1 shows that average membership of the group 
with access to formal credit is larger than the other group. However, in the 
case of informal credit, average membership of the group with credit access is 
smaller than the no-access group.  
 Since meeting of association is also a media for information sharing, 
therefore, members that often attend in meeting perhaps will have better 
information and networking than other members will.  The average of 
meeting attendance of respondents is 3.04 in the last three months. Table 1 
shows mean of meeting attendance of group with access to credit are larger 
than the other group. For example, in the case of formal credit the average of 
meeting attendance is 3.27 and 2.88 for each group, respectively.   
 The survey also asked respondents they were ‘active’ or ‘not active’ in 
the decision making process in the association. This question was only 
addressed to an association that most important  for the head of household.  
The survey found 51 respondents (72.9%) respond that they active in the 
decision making process in association. Table 1 indicates that proportion of 
“active” respondents in the decision making process in the group whose 
credit access is larger than the other group.   
This study also asks to respondents about their social positions in the 
village community.  The first issue is does the head of household was a 
village official during or before the survey conducted.  The second one is does 
the respondent was an informal leader in the village. In order to capture both 
issues, the surveyor ask to each respondent to determine what is the social 
background they used in their involvement in facing social issues or 
problems in the village daily life. Note that each respondent may not only a   5
formal leader but also informal one. Both indicators perhaps represent the 
village elites position that makes them superior in the credit access than other 
members of society in their village. As shown in TABLE 1, there are 23.0 
percents of respondents in the group that have access to formal credit were 
categorised as formal leaders. Similar figure also found in the second 
indicator of the village elite aspect.  For example, in the case of informal 
credit 7 percents are informal leaders. 
 
TABLE 1 Descriptive Statistics of Social Capital and Credit (Mean) 
 
Social capital indicators  Have access to credit 














Number of memberships   4.00  3.08  3.05  3.43  3.81  3.04 
Meeting attendance  2.80  3.08  2.88  3.27  2.75  3.13 
Decision making   0.60  0.75  0.60  0.90  0.63  0.76 
Formal leader   0.20  0.12  0.05  0.23  0.25  0.09 
Informal leader   0.00  0.08  0.03  0.13  0.06  0.07 
Monthly income (000 rupiahs) 1,130.00  759.17  676.25  993.33  1,100.00  726.86 
Amount of credit (000 rupiahs)  -  1,413.50  -  2,607.33  -  122.04 
 
 TABLE 1 also shows two different relations between income and the 
credit type. In average, monthly income of respondents that have access to 
formal credit are larger than the average income of group without access to 
formal credit.  In the contrary, monthly income of respondents with access to 
informal credit is smaller than the group that has no access to this credit type. 
As already known, informal credit in rural area only cover small credit. 
Therefore it is not surprising that average amount of informal credit is very 
smaller comparing to formal credit. In average, amount of formal credit of 30 
respondents are Rp 2,607 millions while in informal credit are only Rp 
122.040.  
The distribution of respondents based on the source of credit is 
presented in TABLE 2. This table shows that 85.7 percents of respondents 
have access to credit. There are 72.9 percents of respondents whose credit 
from ROSCA. It is not surprisingly since ROSCA is an informal credit 
institution that still important for rural people. Other important credit 
sources are banking institutions and cooperation.  
   6
TABLE 2 Source of Credit  
 
Source of credit  n  % 
Family/relative  10  14.3 
Friend/neighbor  4  5.7 
Seller/trader  10  14.3 
ROSCA  51  72.9 
Bank  21  29.0 
Cooperation  18  25.7 
Other  1  1.4 




To investigate the relationship between social capital and credit, this 
study applies econometric approach. It refers partially to the model that has 
applied by Narayan and Prittchett (1997) and Grootaert (1999).  The 
dependent variable is amount of credit received. There are two groups of 
independent variables. The first group is the social capital indicators. The 
second group is the rural elite factors that consist of village officials or formal 
leaders and village informal leaders dummy variables. In addition, the third 
group is the characteristic of household that represent by the household’s 
monthly income.  Ordinary least square (OLS) employs to estimate the 
equation of credit that consists of informal and formal type. 
Since there are two type of credits, estimation run on each credit type 
to explore the impact of social capital and other factors on each credit. 
Dependent variable in this estimation is the amount of credit. Definition of 
these variables was already discussed in the description data. Regression 
results are presented in TABLE 3. 
In the column of ‘amount of total credit’, estimation result shows three 
variables that significantly influence the amount of credit. These variables are 
meeting attendance, dummy variables of formal leader, and dummy variable 
of informal leader. These dummy variables were argued as proxies of the elite 
position issues. 
However, estimation results indicate difference impact of social capital 
on each type of credit. Meeting attendance was the important determinant on 
the amount of formal credit. The positive sign of meeting attendance indicate 
that household which its head have high meeting attendance tend to get high 
amount of formal credit.    7
TABLE 3 Regression Resultsa 
 
Independent Variable   Dependent Variable 

















































R squared   0,445  0,444  0,168 
F-statistic  8,421  8,393  2,121 
Number of observations  70  70  70 
a * denotes significance at 1% level; ** denotes significance at 5% level; *** 
denotes significance at 10% level. Figures in parentheses are t-ratios. 
 
 
Meanwhile, social capital indicator that determine amount of informal 
credit is number of memberships. However the sign of this coefficient 
indicate that membership have negative relationship with informal credit. 
Intuitively this finding indicates that respondents with high memberships in 
local associations tend to avoid informal credit. The negative relation 
between number of memberships and amount of credit are also found in 
formal credit although statistically insignificance.  
Estimation results indicate that decision-making participation does not 
influence the amount of credit in all type of credits. Income variable also does 
not have significance impact of the credit. Note that applying monthly 
expenditure, as an alternative variable for monthly income does not make 
statistical improvement.    8
The regression results also give other interesting finding on the impact 
of formal and informal leader position of respondents.  The dummy variables 
give positive and significance influences on the amount of formal credit but 
insignificance on the informal credit. In the village daily life, the local 
government officials and informal leaders perhaps have an advantage 
position than other member of society. As found in this study, they have 
better access to economic opportunities such as formal credit from banking 




The objective of this study is to investigate empirically the impact of 
social capital on the rural credit. Social capital in this study is focussed on 
three aspects of local association: number of memberships, meeting 
attendance, and participation in decision-making of head of households. 
Based on empirical results on the formal and informal credits, social capital 
has difference impact on each type of credit. Meeting attendance was found 
positively influence the amount of formal credit. Meanwhile, number of 
memberships negatively affects the amount of informal credit. 
This study also analyse two social aspects that represent social position 
of respondents in their village community on the credit. These aspects are 
‘formal leader’ and ‘informal leader’ that were assumed make those rural 
elites have superior position to access the formal credit access than other 
members of society in their village. Estimation results indicate that both 
variables give positive and significance influences on the amount of formal 
credit, but insignificance in the case of informal credit. This finding confirms 
that the rural elites have more accessibility to economic opportunities such as 
formal credit than non-elites do. 
Therefore, this study suggests that the implementation of formal credit 
program in rural areas should consider not only the existing social capital but 
also the social structure of the rural society.  This approach perhaps bring 
improvement on the role of formal credit program as an anti poverty 
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